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1.0 Notification and Authorization 
Mr. Michael Suffredini, International Space Station (ISS) Program Manager, requested an 
independent review of the separate micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) catastrophic risk 
assessments for the Mini-Research Module-2 (MRM-2) performed by both the Russian Federal 
Space Agency and NASA.  The risk assessments produced by the two organizations differed by 
roughly one order of magnitude.   
This NESC assessment was approved as an out-of-board activity on November 2, 2009 by the 
NESC Director.  Mr. Michael Squire, Back-up Principal Engineer at the NASA Langley 
Research Center (LaRC), was selected to lead this assessment.  The stakeholder requested a short 
duration for this activity, so the requirement for an assessment plan was waived.  The results of 
the assessment were presented to the stakeholders on December 17, 2009.  The final report was 
presented and approved by the NESC Review Board on February 3, 2011.  
The stakeholders for this assessment were Mr. Michael Suffredini and the ISS Program. 
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4.0 Executive Summary 
The Mini-Research Module-2 (MRM-2), a Russian module on the International Space Station 
(ISS), does not meet its requirements for micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) probability 
of no penetration (PNP).  To document this condition, the primary Russian Federal Space 
Agency ISS contractor, S.P. Korolev Rocket and Space Corporation-Energia (RSC-E), submitted 
an ISS non-compliance report (NCR), NCR-RS-MRM2-01 (Appendix E), which was presented 
at the 5R Stage Operations Readiness Review (SORR) in October 2009.  In the NCR, RSC-E 
argued for waiving the PNP requirement based on several factors, one of which was the risk of 
catastrophic failure was acceptably low at 1 in 11,100 (0.009 percent).  However, NASA 
independently performed an assessment of the catastrophic risk resulting in a value of 1 in 1380 
(0.07 percent) and believed that the risk at that level was unacceptable.  The NASA Engineering 
and Safety Center (NESC) was requested to evaluate the two competing catastrophic risk values 
and determine which was more accurate. 
 
Because the outcome of this activity was requested to be complete within approximately 6 
weeks, the analysis of the risk assessments of each organization was necessarily performed at a 
high level.  The sources of divergence between RSC-E and NASA catastrophic risk assessments 
were identified as were further areas of analysis that would likely result in a convergence of risk 
assessment values.  During the course of the activity, RSC-E and NASA refined their 
assessments and produced risk values that were within a factor of 2 of each other instead of the 
factor of 10 that was initially observed, so determining which assessment was more accurate 
became less urgent. 
 
The MMOD catastrophic risk is calculated using the risk factor (R or R-factor), which is defined 
as the ratio of catastrophic1 MMOD impacts to total MMOD impacts.  The probability of no 
catastrophic failure (PNCF) is defined as PNCF = PNPR.  The catastrophic risk as a percentage is 
defined as 1-PNCF.  To explore the influence PNP and R have on catastrophic risk, the NESC 
team performed a rudimentary sensitivity study varying PNP and R in PNCF calculations.  The 
results show that while both PNP and R affects the PNCF, the effect of PNP is more pronounced.  
One source of disparity in PNP values (and catastrophic risk) was the MRM-2 finite element 
models (FEM) used by the MMOD risk assessment application Bumper II (Bumper).  The FEM 
used by RSC-E was an older version and contained differences from the FEM used by NASA. 
 
Differing values for R was another contributor to the disparate risk assessments.  The RSC-E and 
NASA R-factors used in initial risk assessments were 0.010 and 0.090, respectively.  Each R-
factor is the summation of individual R-factors for each identified risk, and when the individual 
R-factors were compared, differences between NASA and RSC-E became evident.  For example, 
RSC-E considered the loss of crew due to hypoxia and a docking unit failure to be higher risks 
                                                 
1 A catastrophic failure is one that causes the loss of a crew member or loss of the spacecraft. 
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than NASA (i.e., the RSC-E R-factors for each of those risks are greater than NASA’s).  
Similarly, NASA considered the risks due to fragmentation and internal equipment penetration to 
be higher than RSC-E, and those corresponding R-factors were greater for NASA than RSC-E. 
 
For NASA, R-factors are calculated using the Manned Spacecraft and Crew Survivability 
(MSCSurv) program.  In MSCSurv, the effects of impact velocity are incorporated into the hole 
diameter and crack length predictions using a momentum scaling factor for hole diameter and an 
energy scaling factor for crack length.  In contrast, no velocity effects are evident in the hole 
diameter and crack length equations used by RSC-E, so the equations are valid only for a single 
impact velocity (6.5 km/s) from which the equations were empirically derived.  In addition, there 
is some ambiguity as to the origin of the values for two of the coefficients used in the RSC-E 
crack length equation, where the values given in one reference do not match those provided in 
another.  This may be another source of divergence between risk assessments. 
 
Although the PNCF values converged during the course of this assessment, both the NASA and 
RSC-E PNCFs indicate that additional shielding should be installed on the MRM-2 to bring the 
PNP into compliance and reduce the catastrophic risk.  In addition, because the PNCFs are still 
different by a factor of 2, the NESC team recommends that the two agencies continue to 
collaborate and decrease the discrepancy.  As a part of this, the uncertainties associated with the 
R-factors and PNCFs should be defined.  Finally, NASA’s plans to reevaluate MSCSurv will 
provide R-factors that are a more accurate reflection of the current ISS configuration and 
operation.  
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5.0 Assessment Plan 
The NESC team relied on documentation review (see References and the Appendices for specific 
documents) and interviews with NASA and Russian MMOD organizations to arrive at findings, 
observations and NESC recommendations.  Information from NASA was provided by the NASA 
Astromaterials Research and Exploration Systems/Human Exploration Science (HES) Office.  
Questions for the primary Russian Federal Space Agency ISS contractor, RSC-E, were relayed 
through the HES to their RSC-E counterparts. 
 
6.0 Problem Description and Background 
6.1 MMOD Risk Assessment Methodology and Requirements 
The PNP is used to assess the ability of a spacecraft to resist MMOD impacts.  PNP for a given 
spacecraft is a function of the shield properties, the MMOD environment (flux, directionality, 
mass, size), configuration (e.g., the deployed position of radiators and solar panels may shadow 
areas of the spacecraft), flight attitude, and failure criteria.  Bumper II (Bumper) is the tool used 
by NASA for calculating PNP.  While the PNP gives the probability that an MMOD particle will 
inflict damage exceeding defined failure criteria, it does not describe the potential for the loss of 
life or the loss of the vehicle.  The PNCF gives the probability that an MMOD penetration will 
not cause the loss of a crew member or the loss of the vehicle.   
The ratio of catastrophic impacts to total impacts is the risk factor (R-factor or R).  The PNCF, 
PNP, and R are related as shown in the equation: 
PNCF = (PNP)R                        Eq.  6.1-1 
Like PNP, PNCF is expressed as a decimal numeral with a value less than 1.  The catastrophic 
risk is typically expressed as a percentage and is defined as: 
Catastrophic Risk = 1 – PNCF                                 Eq. 6.1-2 
The R-factor for a spacecraft (or module) is achieved by summing the individual R-factors for 
each failure mode.  This summative R-factor is then used to determine the PNCF and 
catastrophic risk for the overall spacecraft or module. 
The MMOD environment models used for the PNP calculation will affect the resultant PNP.  
The Russian ISS requirements, specified in the Space Station Natural Environment Definition for 
Design (SSP-30425) [ref. 1], state that the orbital debris model used for calculation of PNP is the 
NASA 1991 Orbital Debris Model.  A newer model, ORDEM2000, is available and can also be 
used for PNP calculations, but is not used to meet requirements.  The micrometeoroid model 
specified by Reference 1 used for MMOD risk analysis is the 1991 Meteoroid Model.  The 
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newest meteoroid model is called the Meteoroid Engineering Model (MEM) but also is not used 
to meet requirements. 
 
The NASA-desired PNP requirement for the MRM-2 is PNP ≥ 0.995 based on an exposure 
duration of 15 years.  This is the value specified in the Russian Segment Specification [ref. 2] for 
the Docking Compartment #2 (DC-2), which is structurally identical to the MRM-2.  A 
notification of document change (NDC) has been submitted (NDC-41163-52 Revision B) to 
change “DC-2” to “MRM-2.”  However, RSC-E rejected this change and countered with a 
proposal that the MRM-2 PNP requirement should reflect as-launched MMOD capability (i.e., a 
PNP requirement of 0.9734 for 15 years).  The MMOD requirement for MRM-2 has not been 
resolved, but for this assessment, the requirement of PNP ≥ 0.995 was assumed.  
 
6.2   MRM-2 Risk Assessment 
The MRM-2 (Figure 6.2-1) was launched aboard a modified Progress spacecraft in November 
2010.  It provides a docking port for Progress and Soyuz spacecraft, adds additional space for 
experiments, and contains data-transmission interfaces for external payloads.  It is attached to the 
Russian ISS Segment at the zenith port of the Service Module Transfer Compartment, and 
extends in the zenith direction 4 m (see Figures 6.2-2 and 6.2-3).  The maximum hull diameter is 
2.5 m.  Two EVA hatches oriented 180 degrees apart are on the forward and rear faces of the 
module.  Also located on the MRM-2 exterior is a Strela extendable cargo boom, an equipment 
box, a multipurpose work station, and EVA handrails.  The orientation of the module exposes the 
forward face, including most of the forward hatch, to the highest MMOD risk. 
Separate risk assessments performed by RSC-E and NASA concluded that the MRM-2 MMOD 
PNP was less than the requirement of PNP ≥ 0.995.  Using the 1991 meteoroid and orbital debris 
environments, RSC-E assessed the PNP as 0.985.  Similarly, NASA independently assessed the 
PNP as 0.983 using the same environment models.  The violation was documented in the 
noncompliance report (NCR), NCR-RS-MRM2-01 [Appendix E].  Within the NCR and the 
discussions it generated, there was agreement between RSC-E and NASA that the MRM-2 PNP 
was not in compliance with a PNP ≥ 0.995 requirement.  In the NCR, RSC-E proposed waiving 
the requirement based on several factors, one being that the catastrophic risk for the MRM-2 was 
at an acceptable value of 0.009 percent (1 in 11,100/PNCF = 0.9999).  NASA calculated the 
catastrophic risk as 0.0725 percent (1 in 1380/PNCF = 0.9993) and judged this to be 
unacceptable (there is no requirement for catastrophic risk or PNCF at the module level).  NASA 
further recommended a risk mitigation strategy that included augmenting the MRM-2 MMOD 
shielding.  This catastrophic risk disparity is what the NESC team was requested to evaluate. 
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Figure 6.2-1. MRM-2 
 
Figure 6.2-2. Location of MRM-2 on the ISS Russian Orbital Segment 
  
NASA Engineering and Safety Center  
Technical Assessment Report 
Document #: 
NESC-RP-
09-00592 
Version: 
1.0 
Independent Review of US and Russian PRAs for 
MRM2 MMOD Risk  
Page #: 
13 of 91 
 
NESC Request No.:TI-09-00592 
 
Figure 6.2-3. MRM-2 on Orbit  
7.0 Data and Evaluation 
7.1 Risk Estimates 
The purpose of this NESC assessment was to quickly provide the ISS Program with an opinion 
regarding the Russian and NASA risk assessments performed for the MRM-2.  Time constraints 
limited the NESC team to a high-level review of the methods used by RSC-E and NASA and to 
understand how both parties arrived at their results.  Further study would result in an increased 
understanding of the results. 
 
The PNP and catastrophic risk values originally presented to the NESC team were those from the 
October 26, 2009 5R SORR (see Appendix A) and are shown in Table 7.1-1. 
 
Table 7.1-1. Risk Comparison from October 2009 
Agency PNP R-factor Catastro
phic Risk 
Odds Models 
RSC-E 0.991 0.010 9.0x10-5 1 in 
11,111 
ORDEM2000/1991 meteoroid 
NASA 0.992 0.090 7.2x10-4 1 in 
1385 
ORDEM2000/MEM 
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As the understanding of the MRM-2 MMOD risk matured, the PNP and PNCF evolved from the 
values in contention at the beginning of the assessment.  By December 4, 2009, reassessments 
showed that the difference between the RSC-E and NASA catastrophic risk had decreased from a 
roughly tenfold difference to a difference closer to a factor of two (see Table 7.1-2). 
 
Table 7.1-2.  Risk Comparison from December 2009 
Agency PNP R-factor Catastrophic 
Risk 
Odds Models 
RSC-E 0.9955 0.0512 2.3x10-4 1 in 
4347 
2000 debris/1991 meteoroid 
NASA 0.994 0.077 4.8x10-4 1 in 
2083 
2000 debris/1991 meteoroid 
 
One reason RSC-E’s PNP increased from 0.991 to 0.9955 is because earlier RSC-E PNP 
calculations used estimated stand-off distances between the outer shield (bumper) and the 
pressure wall that were smaller than the actual configuration.  Also, the older PNP runs used 
1998 as the starting year for the debris and meteoroid models, instead of the actual year of 
MRM-2’s launch (2009).  Similarly, an increased understanding of the MRM-2 configuration 
increased the NASA PNP from 0.992 to 0.994. 
7.2     Impact of Divergent PNP and R-Factors on Assessed Risk 
A simple sensitivity study was performed to assess the relative impact PNP and R-factor values 
had on the assessed risk.  Table 7.2-1 presents the most recent values of PNP, R-factor, assessed 
risk, and risk odds for the MRM-2 module, and includes the RSC-E-to-NASA risk ratio.  As seen 
in this table, the assessed risk value calculated by the RSC-E is ~50 percent of the value 
calculated by NASA. 
 
Table 7.2-1. Risk Values Uses as Baseline for Sensitivity Study 
Agency PNP R-Factor Risk Odds RSC-E to 
NASA Risk 
Ratio 
RSC-E 0.9955 0.0512 2.31E-04 1 in 4331 0.50 
NASA 0.994 0.077 4.63E-04 1 in 2159 ---- 
This sensitivity study considered two scenarios.  In Case I, the R-factor was held constant at the 
value equal to the average of the most recent RSC-E and NASA R-factors, while the PNP was 
varied between the most recent RSC-E and NASA values.  In Case II, the PNP was held constant 
at the value equal to the average of the most recent RSC-E and NASA PNPs, while the R-factor 
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was varied between the most recent RSC-E and NASA values.  Tables 7.2-2 and 7.2-3 present 
the results of this study.  It is important to note that since PNP and R-factor are interrelated, 
treating them as independent variables will allow only qualitative conclusions regarding their 
relative effect on assessed risk values. 
 
Table 7.2-2. Case I: Effect of PNP Values on Risk Assuming a Constant R-factor  
Agency PNP Average 
R-Factor 
Risk Odds RSC-E to 
NASA Risk 
Ratio 
RSC-E 0.9955 0.0641 2.89E-04 1 in 3460 0.75 
NASA 0.994 0.0641 3.86E-04 1 in 2593 ---- 
 
Table 7.2-3. Case II: Effect of R-factor Values on Risk Assuming a Constant PNP  
Agency Average 
PNP 
R-Factor Risk Odds RSC-E to 
NASA Risk 
Ratio 
RSC-E 0.99475 .0512 2.69E-04 1 in 3711 0.66 
NASA 0.99475 0.077 4.04E-04 1 in 2468 ---- 
 
As illustrated in Tables 7.2-2 and 7.2-3, increasing the PNP from the NASA value of 0.994 to the 
RSC-E value of 0.9955, while assuming a constant average R-factor would result in an assessed 
risk by RSC-E that is 75 percent of what would be NASA’s assessed risk.  Also, decreasing the 
R-factor from the NASA value of 0.077 to the RSC-E value of 0.0512, while assuming a 
constant average PNP would result in an assessed risk by RSC-E that is 66 percent of what 
would be NASA’s assessed risk.  This shows that the assessed risk is more sensitive to PNP 
changes than changes to R. 
7.3 Causes of PNCF Disparity: Finite Element Model (FEM)  
Both NASA and RSC-E use Bumper to perform MMOD risk assessments and to calculate the 
PNP.  An FEM that describes the spacecraft geometry is created in Integrated Design and 
Engineering Analysis Software (IDEAS) and used by Bumper.  The FEM is separated into 
different elements, each identified with a property identifier (PID).   During the course of this 
activity, it was verified that the FEM used by NASA for their ISS Bumper risk assessment was 
different than the one used by RSC-E.  The FEM was provided by RSC-E, but RSC-E was using 
an older version for their risk assessments.  Figures 7.3-1 and 7.3-2 graphically illustrate the 
differences between the two FEMs in question.  
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Figure 7.3-1.  FEM used by RSC-E in Bumper Assessment Showing PID Assignments 
 
 
Figure 7.3-2.  FEM used by NASA in Bumper Assessment Showing PID Assignments 
 
7.4 Causes of PNCF Disparity: R-factor 
Another reason for differences in PNCF is disparity in R-factors chosen by RSC-E and NASA.  
The R-factor used by RSC-E in the PNCF estimate presented in the October 2009 NCR was 
0.010, resulting in a catastrophic risk of 9.0x10-5.  However, NASA used an R-factor of 0.090 to 
arrive at a catastrophic risk of 7.2x10-4 (see Table 7.1-1).  Like the PNPs, R-factors also changed 
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from October to December 2009.  RSC-E’s reassessment of catastrophic risk changed the R-
factor from 0.010 to 0.0512, causing an increase in catastrophic risk.  The NASA catastrophic 
risk actually decreased because the R-factor of 0.090 used in the October assessment was 
changed to 0.077 in the December assessment.   
Table 7.4-1 illustrates the individual risk factors and the assumptions that led to the respective R-
factors for NASA and RSC-E.  In general, the differences can be summarized as: 
 NASA does not include docking unit failure as a risk, 
 RSC-E considers the loss of crew due to hypoxia to be a higher risk factor than NASA, 
 NASA considers the risk due to fragmentation to be higher than RSC-E, and 
 RSC-E does not consider the risk due to the catastrophic destruction of internal 
pressurized tanks. 
 
Table 7.4-1.  R-factor Comparison (N/C = Not Calculated in Analysis Provided) 
NASA 
R 
RSC-E 
R 
Risk Description Comments 
0 N/C Critical crack (unzipping) 
causes loss of ISS 
 
0 N/C External equipment 
penetration causes loss of ISS 
 
0.063 N/C Internal systemic equipment 
penetration causes loss of ISS 
NASA assumption is the presence of internal 
pressurized tanks. 
0 0.02435 Docking unit failure  
0.004 0.02519 Hypoxia causes loss of crew Depends on hole size and time it takes crew to 
egress ISS.  RSC-E assumes time of 9.5 
minutes, while NASA uses a distribution 
relating to crew position and amount of time 
spent in different areas of the station. 
0.010 0.00168 Fragmentation causes loss of 
crew 
NASA probably assumed a higher occupancy 
that RSC-E. 
0 N/C Thrust induced angular 
velocity causes loss of crew 
 
 
To further examine the differences between the Russian and NASA risk assessments requires a 
closer examination of the Russian and NASA probability risk assessment (PRA) processes.  The 
ISS MMOD PRA process is described in Appendix C, with details pertaining to RSC-E in 
Reference 3 and NASA in References 4 and 5.  Due to the short timeline and high-level review, 
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many questions remained unanswered that, if addressed, would result in an increased 
understanding of the respective PRA processes and their differences.  
NASA PRA Process – Hole Diameter and Crack Length Calculations 
The NASA PRA process is based on the application Manned Spacecraft and Crew Survivability 
(MSCSurv), which provides as an output the R-factor.  In the version of MSCSurv [ref. 5] used 
for these assessments, hole diameter and crack length resulting from an MMOD impact are 
calculated using empirical equations that were developed for 14 common ISS wall configurations 
[ref. 6].  These equations are based on impact test data obtained at an impact velocity of ~6.5 
km/s.  The effects of impact velocity are incorporated into the hole diameter and crack length 
predictions by NASA using a momentum scaling factor for hole diameter and an energy scaling 
factor for crack length [ref. 7]. 
RSC-E PRA Process – Hole Diameter and Crack Length Calculations 
With respect to the RSC-E PRA process, the equations for module wall hole diameter and 
maximum tip-to-tip crack length (Equations 7.4-1 and 7.4-2) presented in Section 2.2.2 of 
Reference 3 appear to be based on the empirical equations provided in Reference 6 that were 
developed in 1995 using data collected from high speed impact tests performed at impact 
velocities near 6.5 km/s. 
                                        
      
   
  
   
   
                                                  Eq. 7.4-1  
                                         
      
   
  
   
   
                                                   Eq. 7.4-2  
where: 
 
   = effective hole diameter (cm) 
   = maximum crack length (cm) 
   = diameter of a spherical particle (cm) 
  = incidence angle 
    = ballistic diameter limit for an impact velocity of 6.5 km/s and angle of incidence θ 
A, B and C = factors that vary with hole diameter and crack length.  For hole diameters 
in a typical Russian module shield: A = 4.323 cm, B = 0.416 cm, and C = 1.474 cm.  For 
a pressurized hull crack length, A = 4.89 cm, B = 0.633 cm, and C = 1.44 cm. 
No velocity effects are evident in the RSC-E hole diameter and crack length equations.  
Therefore, these equations are strictly valid at a single impact velocity of 6.5 km/s.  RSC-E is 
apparently aware of this restriction and their PRA process and catastrophic risk calculations 
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ignore velocity effects (see Appendix B).  As such, the RSC-E risk and PNCF values are 
obtained without considering impact velocity effects. 
RSC-E presented a method for incorporating impact velocity effects for very large projectiles 
(dp/hb > 20) in Reference 3, pages 4-5 (shown in equations 7.4-3 and 7.4-4), but not for smaller 
projectiles. 
                                                          
   
                                              Eq. 7.4-3 
 
where: 
 
   = effective hole diameter (cm) 
   = diameter of a spherical particle (cm) 
h = barrier thickness (aluminum equivalent) 
V = impact velocity (km/s) 
 
                                    
 
 
   
                    
 
   
   
     
   
 
                    Eq. 7.4-4 
where: 
 
  = particle mass (units not given) 
    = particle velocity before impact (km/s) 
    = particle velocity after impact (km/s) 
   = effective hole diameter (cm) 
   = shield thickness (cm) 
   = shield material density (units not given) 
Equations 7.4-3 and 7.4-4 for the larger projectiles are based on the conservation of momentum. 
The RSC-E PRA predictions might change if an energy balance were used (i.e., energy losses 
due to shock heating, etc. would be subtracted out).  It would also be instructive to compare the 
predictions of the momentum-based approach (or a combined energy-and-momentum-based 
approach) against actual data, and against the predictions of empirical hole size and crack length 
equations for the particle size regime considered. 
Empirical Equation Coefficient Issues 
Inspection of the values of the coefficients A, B, and C in Equation 7.4-1 (from Reference 3) for 
hole diameter reveals that all three values match the values of A, B, and C in Reference 6 for the 
Research Module hole diameter equation.  However, the values of B and C for crack length as 
given in Reference 3 (Equation 7.4-2) do not match the values of B and C in Reference 6 for the 
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Research Module crack length equation (Table 7.4-2, in blue).  The value of A for the crack 
length equation in Reference 3 does match the value of A in Reference 6, indicating that the 
asymptotic value of crack length according to Reference 3 will eventually match that of 
Reference 6.  
=
(                                                   Eq. 7.4-2 
Coefficient Value for Hole 
Diameter from 
Ref. 3 (cm)
Value for Hole 
Diameter from 
Ref. 6 (cm)
Value for Crack 
Length from Ref. 
3 (cm)
Value for Crack
Length from Ref. 
6 (cm)
A 4.323 4.323 4.89 4.89
B 0.416 0.416 0.633 0.498
C 1.474 1.474 1.44 9.518
When RSC-E was queried regarding the source of the values of B and C for the crack length 
equation in Reference 3, their reply was that they are based on the “experimental results obtained 
in MSFC [where] the crack length = 1.5 x penetration hole.” From the form of equation 7.4-2, it 
is evident that coefficient B factors in the effects of impact obliquity, while coefficient C governs 
the rate at which the equation’s asymptotic value is reached. However, the values of B and C 
given for the crack length equation do not appear to cause the crack length values calculated 
using that equation to be 1.5 times the pressure wall hole diameter.  If that were the desired end 
result, then it would appear that the value of coefficient A for the crack length equation would 
need to be 1.5 times the value of the coefficient A for the hole diameter equation.  However, 
those two values as given in Reference 3 are within approximately 10 percent of each other 
(Table 7.4-2, in pink). Hence, the explanation provided by RSC-E regarding how the values of B 
and C for the crack length equation are obtained is not clear and should be revisited to more fully 
understand the role of these coefficients in affecting the outcomes of the RSC-E PRA process.  A
review of the Research Module pressure wall hole diameter and maximum tip-to-tip crack length 
data obtained at impact test velocities near 6.5 km/s reveals that crack lengths are, on average,
approximately 1.33 times larger than corresponding hole diameters [ref. 8] over all of the impact 
obliquities and projectile diameters tested. Therefore, the RSC-E contention that the crack length 
= 1.5 x penetration hole diameter appears to be reasonable and should yield more conservative 
(i.e. higher) values of assessed risk if implemented in a PRA process.  
Figure 7.4-1 compares predictions of pressure wall tip-to-tip crack length for normal 6.5 km/s 
impacts on a Research Module wall target as given by Equation 7.4-2 using the values of the 
coefficients B and C given in Reference 3 (the RSC-E equation), and in Reference 6 (the NASA-
Table 7.4-2. Coefficients for Equation 7.4-2 
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equivalent equation).  Empirical crack length data for this type of impact on this wall system are 
also shown.  As can be seen in Figure 7.4-1, crack-length predictions can vary significantly 
depending on the values of the coefficients B and C.  Specifically, using the values of B and C 
identified by RSC-E results in predictions of crack length that are smaller than if the coefficients 
generated by the NASA-equivalent equation were used.  
 
Figure 7.4-1. Comparison of RSC-E Empirical Predictions of Tip-to-Tip Crack Length for the 
Russian Research Module, Normal Impact at 6.5 km/s 
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8.0 Findings, Observations, and NESC Recommendations 
8.1 Findings 
The following findings were identified: 
 
F-1.  Based on the risk assessment for either source, augmented MMOD shielding for MRM-2 
is warranted for MRM-2. 
 
F-2.  According to the most recently produced values, the discrepancy between NASA and 
RSC-E risk is approximately a factor of 2, instead of the factor of 10 displayed at the 5R 
SORR. 
 
F-3.  The planned NASA and RSC-E tasks are appropriate to close the gap between the 
MMOD risk assessments. 
 
F-4.  Variations in PNCF between NASA and RSC-E may be caused by: 
 RSC-E using older FEM than NASA, 
 PNP calculations using different property identification mapping, and 
 Differing assumptions resulting in different R-factors. 
 
F-5.  The components of the individual R-factors are different, and this may cause a larger 
variation in PNCF than either NASA or RSC-E are currently accounting for.  Variations 
in R-factor between NASA and RSC-E may be caused by: 
 RSC-E assuming no risk due to pressurized tanks within the module while NASA 
does, 
 NASA not accounting for docking mechanism failure, 
 RSC-E assuming higher risk of hypoxia, 
 RSC-E assuming lower risk from fragmentation (function of time spent in module), 
and 
 Differences between how NASA and RSC-E calculate rear wall hole diameter and 
crack length, including an apparent lack of velocity effects in the RSC-E approach 
across the entire impact velocity spectrum (i.e., 1-16 km/s) and the use of empirical 
equation coefficients of unknown origin. 
 
F-6.  With the information available, the two PNCFs cannot be adequately evaluated. 
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F-7.  Different uncertainty assumptions may contribute to different risk assessments. 
 
F-8.  There is no NASA mechanism for incorporating changes in the R-factor due to model 
changes, shield changes, and operational changes.  
8.2  Observations 
O-1. It is unclear how NASA and RSC-E take into account the differences in construction 
between the actual MRM-2 and the Research Module wall system as tested in 1995 in 
their hole diameter and crack length equations. 
O-2. Some of the empirical coefficients used by RSC-E in its empirical crack length equation 
do not match corresponding coefficients in the original reference for the equation, and the 
explanation provided by RSC-E does not appear to fully explain the differences.  
O-3. Using the RSC-E equation for crack length could lead to values of assessed risk that are 
lower as compared to those that might be obtained using the NASA-equivalent equation, 
assuming no other variations between the RSC-E and NASA PRA processes. 
 
O-4. Considering the magnitudes of the changes in PNP and R-factor values and the resulting 
corresponding changes in assessed risk values, it is evident that assessed risk value is 
more sensitive to changes in PNP value than it is to changes in R-factor value.  
 
8.3 NESC Recommendations 
The following NESC recommendations were identified and directed towards the ISS Program 
unless otherwise identified: 
 
R-1.  Install additional MMOD shielding on the MRM-2 to reduce the PNP to the level 
specified in the requirements. (F-1 and F-3) 
 
R-2.  Continue NASA and RSC-E collaboration to narrow the gap between R-factors and 
PNCF for MRM-2. (F-2, F-3, F-5, F-6, and F-7) 
 
R-3.  Define uncertainties in PNCFs and the terms factored into their calculation.  
(F-5, F-6, and F-7) 
 
R-4.  Proceed with current NASA plans to update R-factors in risk assessments. (F-7 and F-8) 
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9.0 Alternate Viewpoints 
There were no alternate viewpoints identified during the course of this assessment by the NESC 
team or the NRB quorum. 
10.0 Other Deliverables 
No unique hardware, software, or data packages, outside those contained in this report, were 
disseminated to other parties outside this assessment. 
11.0 Lessons Learned 
No applicable lessons learned were identified for entry into the NASA Lessons Learned 
Information System (LLIS). 
12.0 Definition of Terms  
Corrective Actions Changes to design processes, work instructions, workmanship practices, 
training, inspections, tests, procedures, specifications, drawings, tools, 
equipment, facilities, resources, or material that result in preventing, 
minimizing, or limiting the potential for recurrence of a problem.  
 
Finding A conclusion based on facts established by the investigating authority.  
 
Lessons Learned Knowledge or understanding gained by experience. The experience may 
be positive, as in a successful test or mission, or negative, as in a mishap 
or failure. A lesson must be significant in that it has real or assumed 
impact on operations; valid in that it is factually and technically correct; 
and applicable in that it identifies a specific design, process, or decision 
that reduces or limits the potential for failures and mishaps, or reinforces a 
positive result.  
 
Observation A factor, event, or circumstance identified during the assessment that did 
not contribute to the problem, but if left uncorrected has the potential to 
cause a mishap, injury, or increase the severity should a mishap occur.  
Alternatively, an observation could be a positive acknowledgement of a 
Center/Program/Project/Organization’s operational structure, tools, and/or 
support provided. 
 
Problem The subject of the independent technical assessment. 
Proximate Cause  The event(s) that occurred, including any condition(s) that existed 
immediately before the undesired outcome, directly resulted in its 
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occurrence and, if eliminated or modified, would have prevented the 
undesired outcome. 
 
Recommendation An action identified by the NESC to correct a root cause or deficiency 
identified during the investigation.  The recommendations may be used by 
the responsible Center/Program/Project/Organization in the preparation of 
a corrective action plan. 
 
Root Cause One of multiple factors (events, conditions, or organizational factors) that 
contributed to or created the proximate cause and subsequent undesired 
outcome and, if eliminated or modified, would have prevented the 
undesired outcome.  Typically, multiple root causes contribute to an 
undesired outcome. 
13.0 Acronyms List 
DC-2 Docking Compartment #2 
FEM                Finite Element Model 
IDEAS             Integrated Design and Engineering Analysis Software 
ISS          International Space Station 
LaRC      Langley Research Center 
MEM      Meteoroid Engineering Model  
MEO Meteoroid Environment Office 
MMOD  Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris 
MOD      Mission Operations Directorate 
MRM-2  Mini-Research Module 2 
MSFC     Marshall Space Flight Center 
MTSO     Management and Technical Support Office 
NCR Noncompliance Report 
NDC Notification of Document Change 
NESC      NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
NRB        NESC Review Board 
PID Property Identifier 
PNCF      Probability of No Catastrophic Failure  
PNP        Probability of no Penetration 
PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
R Risk Factor 
RSC-E     S.P. Korolev Rocket and Space Corporation – Energia 
SORR Stage Operations Readiness Review  
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 Appendix A. 5R Stage Operations Readiness Review
 
 
 
The documents presented in Appendix A, while pre-decisional 
when created, are now considered to be post-decisional 
due to events that have transpired since the date of the presentation.
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Appendix B. Questions to RSC-E with Replies 
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Appendix C. ISS Probabilistic Risk Assessment: MMOD Assessment 
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